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 What Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human 
Social Cognition? 
 PIERRE  JACOB 
 Abstract :  According to an inﬂ uential view, one function of mirror neurons (MNs), 
ﬁ rst discovered in the brain of monkeys, is to underlie third-person mindreading. This 
view relies on two assumptions: the activity of MNs in an observer ’ s brain matches 
(simulates or resonates with) that of MNs in an agent ’ s brain and this resonance process 
retrodictively generates a representation of the agent ’ s intention from a perception of 
her movement. In this paper, I criticize both assumptions and I argue instead that the 
activity of MNs in an observer ’ s brain is enhanced by a prior representation of the 
agent ’ s intention and that their task is to predictively compute the best motor command 
suitable to satisfy the agent ’ s intention. 
 Introduction 
 One of the most remarkable contributions of cognitive neuroscience in the past 
ﬁ fteen years or so has been the discovery of so-called  ‘ mirror neurons ’ (MNs) in 
the ventral premotor cortex of macaque monkeys and the subsequent discovery of 
a  ‘ mirror system ’ in the human brain. 1 MNs are sensorimotor neurons that ﬁ re 
both when an animal is executing some kinds of hand or mouth action directed 
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  1  Ramachandran (2000) has gone as far as claiming that  ‘ mirror neurons will do for psychology 
what DNA did for biology  … provide a unifying framework and help explain a host of 
mental abilities that have hitherto remained mysterious and inaccessible to experiments ’ . The 
obvious question is: which mental abilities will be accounted for by MNs? 
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towards a target and when the animal is observing a conspeciﬁ c (or an experimenter) 
perform the same kind of actions. Their activity has been alleged to underlie such 
cognitive capacities as imitation learning ( Rizzolatti  et al. , 2001; Rizzolatti and 
Craighero, 2004 ), mindreading ( Gallese and Goldman, 1998 ), and even language 
understanding ( Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998 ). Here, I will concentrate on 
mindreading. 
 Roughly speaking, the reasoning that led  Gallese and Goldman (1998) to the 
view that MNs might underlie mindreading involves the following three steps. 
First, the activity of MNs is treated as a replicative or resonance mechanism in 
which the ﬁ ring of MNs in an observer ’ s brain resonates with (or matches) the 
ﬁ ring of MNs in the agent ’ s brain. 2 Secondly, by duplicating the activity of MNs 
in an agent ’ s brain, the activity of MNs in an observer ’ s brain is taken to constitute 
an automatic mental simulation of the agent ’ s observed movements: the activity of 
MNs in the observer ’ s brain enables the observer to match the agent ’ s observed 
movements onto her own motor repertoire (without executing the movements in 
question). Finally, by performing a mental simulation of the agent ’ s observed 
movements, the activity of MNs is seen as enabling the observer to recognize the 
agent ’ s action, or even to represent her intention (or goal). Since representing an 
agent ’ s intention is unquestionably part of third-person mindreading, it turns out 
that one fundamental function of MNs is to underlie mindreading. 
 As the above reconstruction makes clear, the reasoning used to link MNs to 
mindreading borrows concepts from the simulation approach to mindreading. 
Conversely, it might be — and has been — argued that the discovery of MNs 
vindicates the simulation approach to mindreading by showing that there are 
neural simulation mechanisms in the primate brain which enable an observer to 
make sense of an agent ’ s action based on the perception of her movements. 
 I agree that if the activity of MNs in an observer ’ s brain did generate a 
representation of an agent ’ s intention, then MNs would contribute to mindreading. 
However, I think that two of the steps used to reach this conclusion are questionable. 
I will assume for the sake of argument that by replicating the activity of MNs in 
an agent ’ s brain, the activity of MNs in an observer ’ s brain constitutes a mental 
simulation of the agent ’ s observed movements. But, ﬁ rst, it is highly questionable 
whether by mentally rehearsing an agent ’ s observed movements, an observer could 
represent the agent ’ s underlying intention. Secondly, some recent evidence casts 
doubt on the assumption that the activity of MNs is a replicative (or resonance) 
process and suggests instead that it is a predictive process. Since I argue against the 
view that the activity of MNs underlies mindreading by virtue of representing an 
agent ’ s intention, I must provide an alternative answer to the question: what is the 
function of MNs? Representing an agent ’ s action involves at least two 
complementary parts: representing the agent ’ s intention and representing the 
  2  I will use the verbs  ‘ to resonate ’ ,  ‘ to match ’ ,  ‘ to rehearse ’ ,  ‘ to replicate ’ and  ‘ to duplicate ’ 
interchangeably. 
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motor command by which this intention is achieved. 3 I argue that the activity of 
MNs contributes to the latter, not to the former. Furthermore, whereas an agent ’ s 
intention (which is the cause of her motor act) can only be retrodicted from the 
perception of her motor act, the motor command that will generate her next 
move can be predicted. Thus, I argue that the activity of MNs is predictive, not 
retrodictive. 
 In the ﬁ rst section, I shall review the evidence adduced to support the view that 
what I shall call  ‘ interpersonal mirroring ’ is a replicative process, or that the activity 
of MNs in an observer ’ s brain matches the activity of MNs in the agent ’ s brain. In 
the second section, I shall examine the simulation approach to mindreading 
generated by incorporating MNs as processes of neural simulation. In the third 
section, I shall argue that motor resonance is neither a necessary nor a sufﬁ cient 
mechanism for representing an agent ’ s intentions. I will further show that very 
recent evidence has led MN theorists to endorse a modiﬁ ed view of MNs, on 
which the function of interpersonal mirroring turns out  not  to be replicative but 
rather predictive. If MNs are predictive, then what they predict must be the agent ’ s 
next move, not the agent ’ s intention that caused her observed movement. In the 
last section, I shall argue for an alternative view (already considered by  Csibra, 
2005 ), on which the function of MNs is to compute (and thereby predict), not the 
agent ’ s intention, but the motor command suitable for achieving the intention. 
 1. The Direct Matching or Resonance Model of Action Understanding 
 As noted above, MNs were ﬁ rst discovered in the ventral premotor cortex of 
macaque monkeys. The reason that MNs were so-called is that they are sensorimotor 
neurons with both motor and perceptual properties: they ﬁ re both when an animal 
is executing some kinds of transitive (i.e. directed towards a target) hand and/or 
mouth action and when the animal is observing a conspeciﬁ c (or a human 
experimenter) perform the same kind of action. The perceptual properties of MNs 
are said to  ‘ mirror ’ their motor properties. 4 As a result, when an animal observes a 
conspeciﬁ c perform a transitive action, the activity of MNs in her brain is said to 
 ‘ mirror ’ the activity of MNs in the agent ’ s brain. This interpersonal mirroring 
appears to be a matching of brain activity, enabling an observer to perform a motor 
simulation of the agent ’ s observed movements without executing them. In any 
case, MNs deserve to be so-called only if the congruence between their perceptual 
and motor properties is statistically strong enough — a point disputed by  Csibra 
(2004) . 
  3  As I will show in section 4.3, cognitive neuroscience suggests that the intuitive notion of 
having a goal can be decomposed into a motor and a sensory representation. 
  4  As noticed by  Sperber (2004) , the expression  ‘ mirror neurons ’ has understandably caught 
people ’ s attention and triggered their imagination. For mouth actions, see  Ferrari  et al. , 2003 . 
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 1.1 MNs in Monkeys 
 The ventral premotor cortex of macaque monkeys contains not only MNs but also 
so-called  ‘ canonical ’ neurons, whose motor properties are the same as those of 
MNs (they ﬁ re when the animal executes transitive hand and mouth actions), but 
which differ in their perceptual properties. Unlike MNs, canonical neurons do not 
ﬁ re when the animal perceives an action directed towards a target; rather, they ﬁ re 
when the animal perceives an object that can be the target of an action. There are 
also cells in the Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS) which have perceptual properties 
in common with MNs (they also ﬁ re in response to the perception of actions 
performed by conspeciﬁ cs), but lack corresponding motor properties: they only 
ﬁ re when the recorded animal is observing another agent, never when he performs 
an action himself ( Perrett  et al. , 1982; 1989; Keysers and Perrett, 2004 ). 5 
 For a decade, MN theorists have reported experiments revealing the congruence 
between the motor and perceptual properties of MNs.  Umiltà  et al.  (2001) have 
shown that MNs in the ventral premotor cortex ﬁ re both when the animal executes 
a transitive hand action and when he observes such a hand action performed by 
another and knows that there is a target, even if the target is hidden behind an 
occluder. However, if there is no target and the animal knows it, then MNs fail to 
ﬁ re. (On the cross-modal properties of MNs in perceptual tasks, see  Kohler  et al. , 
2002; Keysers  et al. , 2003 .) Thus, the evidence shows that in monkeys, the activity 
of MNs in an observer ’ s brain is restricted to the perception of actions directed 
towards a physical target. 
 1.2 The Mirror System in Humans 
 Since the discovery of MNs in the monkey brain, much evidence from brain 
imaging has revealed the existence of a  ‘ mirror system ’ network in humans (cf. 
 Rizzolatti  et al. , 2001 and  Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004 ). This evidence suggests 
that the activity of the mirror network in humans is involved in the execution and 
observation of a wider class of actions than in non-human primates, including 
intransitive actions (not directed towards a target) such as pantomimes and ostensive 
communicative gestures. Of the numerous experiments, I will merely mention 
three of particular note. 
 In a TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation) study,  Fadiga  et al.  (1995) have 
shown that the observation of hand actions executed by others prompted a motor 
facilitation in the very same arm and hand muscles that were being used by the 
agents of the observed actions. 6 In an fMRI study,  Buccino  et al.  (2001) showed 
that, compared to observation of a static face, hand or foot, observation of both 
transitive and intransitive actions involving movements of the hand, mouth or foot 
led to the somatotopic activation of the premotor cortex. In another fMRI study, 
  5  In fact, they respond to the perception of a wider class of actions than MNs. 
  6  However,  Romani  et al.  (2005) also report motor facilitation prompted by the observation 
of  biologically impossible  ﬁ nger movements. 
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 Buccino  et al.  (2001) had subjects watch silent ﬁ lms showing a human, a monkey 
or a dog perform either a transitive or an intransitive action (the transitive action 
was biting food, the human intransitive action was silent speech, and the dog ’ s 
intransitive action was barking). They found, on the one hand, that observation of 
a transitive action by any agent led to global activation in the areas involved in the 
mirror system, and on the other hand, that the activation of motor areas increased 
as a function of whether the observed action could be matched onto the observer ’ s 
motor repertoire: it was signiﬁ cantly stronger for human silent speech than for dog 
barking. 
 1.3 MNs and Action Understanding 
 Based on this evidence, MN theorists have argued for a basic distinction between 
two ways an observed action can be represented and understood (cf.  Rizzolatti 
 et al. , 2001 ). Actions involving movements that belong to the observer ’ s motor 
repertoire can be mapped onto the observer ’ s motor system. Observation of such 
actions causes the observer ’ s motor system to  resonate . By mapping an agent ’ s 
observed movements onto her own motor repertoire (i.e. by motor resonance), an 
observer achieves a distinctive kind of  ‘ engaged ’ or immediate understanding. This 
is the  resonance  model of action understanding. 
 By contrast, actions that do not belong to the observer ’ s motor repertoire and 
cannot be so mapped must be categorized on the basis of their visual properties. 
For example, a primate may have the capacity for a detached visual analysis of a 
bird ’ s ﬂ ight, but lack a motor understanding of it, since a primate cannot match a 
bird ’ s wing movements onto his own motor repertoire. Actions that cannot be 
understood by motor resonance (or MN activity) will be recognized through the 
activity of purely perceptual brain areas (such as the inferotemporal lobe and the 
STS). The understanding thereby achieved lacks the immediacy of the understanding 
delivered by motor resonance. As  Gallese  et al.  (2004) write: 
 We will posit that, in our brain, there are neural mechanisms (mirror mechanisms) 
that allow us to directly understand the meaning of the actions and emotions of 
others by internally replicating ( ‘ simulating ’ ) them without any explicit reﬂ ective 
mediation [ … ] The fundamental mechanism that allows us a direct experiential 
grasp of the mind of others is [ … ] direct simulation of the observed events 
through the mirror mechanisms [ … ] A crucial element of social cognition is the 
brain ’ s capacity to directly link the ﬁ rst- and third-person experiences of these 
phenomena (i.e. link  ‘ I do and I feel ’ with  ‘ he does and he feels ’ ). We will 
deﬁ ne this mechanism simulation ( Gallese  et al. , 2004 , p. 396). 7 
  7  As this makes clear,  Gallese  et al.  (2004) extend the role of mirroring processes to an immediate 
understanding of others ’ emotions. For reasons of space, I shall not examine this interesting 
extension here, which is used as a major step by  Gallese (2003, 2004) and  Goldman (2004) in 
supporting the view that not all mirroring processes are motor processes, but see section 2.4. 
© 2008 The Author
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
 Mirror Neurons and Human Social Cognition   195 
 As the quote makes clear,  Gallese  et al.  (2004) assume that the activity of MNs 
in an observer ’ s brain constitutes an internal replication of the agent ’ s observed 
movements and that such internal replication yields an engaged form of 
understanding of the observed action, i.e. an understanding that reﬂ ects the fact 
that the observer has the motor resources for producing tokens of the type of 
bodily movements performed by the agent. By contrast, a purely visual analysis of 
the components of the action does not deliver such an engaged (motor) 
understanding. However, it is one thing to distinguish between an engaged and a 
disengaged (or detached) understanding of an agent ’ s action, based on motor 
resonance, and quite another thing to make the further and stronger claim that 
motor resonance also yields a  ‘ direct experiential grasp of the [agent ’ s] mind ’ . This 
latter claim is stronger because, unless one subscribes to behaviorism, it does not 
seem as if being able to match an observed movement onto one ’ s motor repertoire 
is sufﬁ cient for knowing what the agent has in mind. 8 So  Gallese  et al. ’ s (2004) 
stronger claim raises the following question: could the engaged understanding of 
an agent ’ s action based on motor resonance constitute an instance of third-person 
mindreading? 
 2. The Scope of the Mental Simulation Approach to Mindreading 
 What  Baron-Cohen (1995) has called  ‘ mindreading ’ is the cognitive ability to 
represent the psychological states (perceptions, emotions, intentions, desires, 
beliefs, etc.) of oneself and others. 9 Most philosophers and psychologists assume 
that healthy human adults make extensive social use of their mindreading ability in 
describing, explaining and predicting their own and others ’ actions. At this stage, 
the exact nature of the cognitive mechanisms underlying human mindreading 
remains controversial, and so do their phylogenetic history and ontogenetic 
development. Nonetheless, one thing seems clear: to perform a third-person 
mindreading task is to form a belief about another ’ s psychological state. So the 
question arises: could what  Gallese  et al.  (2004) call a direct experiential (non-
conceptually mediated) grasp of another ’ s mind be classiﬁ ed as an instance of third-
person mindreading? 
 In an insightful discussion,  Goldman (2004, 2006 , pp. 133-37) has expressed 
doubts. On Goldman ’ s view, mirroring might be necessary for reading another ’ s 
mind, but cannot be sufﬁ cient. 10 Mirroring (or motor resonance) is the phenomenon 
  8  This point has recently been made by  Borg (2007) . 
  9  Although full-blown human mindreading can be both third-personal and ﬁ rst-personal, in 
this paper, I deal exclusively with third-person mindreading. See e.g.  Nichols and Stich, 
2003 and  Goldman, 2006 . 
 10  As I will explain in this section,  Goldman ’ s (2006) view that mirroring is a necessary condition 
for mindreading follows from his views (i) that mirroring is one instance of mental simulation 
and (ii) that mental simulation is a basis for mindreading. In section 3.1, I shall question the 
assumption that mirroring is  necessary  for mindreading. 
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whereby an observer ’ s brain activity is caused by similar brain activity in the agent: 
the activity in the agent ’ s brain causes her to make a movement, and the observer ’ s 
perception of this movement causes the observer to undergo an analogous brain 
activity. (I take it that an observer ’ s premotor cortex could not resonate with 
another ’ s action if the observer could not perceive the agent ’ s motor act.) 11 
According to Goldman, mirroring (or motor resonance) is not sufﬁ cient for 
mindreading because mindreading requires attribution of some psychological state 
or other to the agent (who is being mindread). If performing a third-person 
mindreading task involves forming a belief about another ’ s psychological state, 
then unless she possessed the concept of the relevant psychological state, the 
mindreader could not impute it to the agent. 
 In the 1980 ’ s, the empirical investigation of human mindreading provoked a 
lively debate between two main approaches: the  ‘ theory-theory ’ (TT) and the 
 ‘ simulation ’ (ST) approaches. According to TT approaches, mindreading is a kind 
of detached naïve psychological theorizing based on tacit knowledge of folk 
psychological laws relating unobservable psychological states to one another, to 
observable (sensory) inputs and to observable (behavioral) outputs. 12 By contrast, 
ST approaches assume that what underlies mindreading is psychological similarity. 
Central to ST accounts are the concept of  pretence  and the thesis that what enables 
an individual to engage in third-person mindreading tasks is not her tacit knowledge 
of naive psychological laws, but the fact that she shares the very same cognitive 
resources as the individual whom she is trying to mindread. According to ST 
accounts, third-person mindreading tasks involve use of these shared cognitive 
resources  ‘ off-line ’ for purposes of imaginative pretence. 13 An advocate of ST 
might thus expect there to be brain mechanisms that generate a representation and 
understanding of an agent ’ s intention by mentally rehearsing her observed action. 
 So the discovery of MNs in the 1990 ’ s raised the intriguing prospect that what 
I earlier called  ‘ interpersonal mirroring ’ processes might be novel instances of 
mental simulation, in addition to pretence. This would broaden the explanatory 
 11  An anonymous referee interestingly suggests that an observer (e.g. a reader of a hand-written 
text) might be said to  ‘ resonate ’ with an agent ’ s act (e.g. the author’s hand-writing) if she 
merely imagined (rather than perceives) the agent ’ s act. But if so, then this would be resonance 
in a loose sense. It is not clear at all that resonance in this sense is available to non-human 
primates, in whose brains MNs were discovered and who cannot either write or read. 
 12  For purposes of the present paper, which is entirely devoted to extensions of ST accounts of 
mindreading, TT accounts are adequately characterized as psychological versions of the 
functionalist view of psychological states, earlier developed by philosophers of mind. Cf. 
 Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik and Wellman, 1992, 1994 . 
 13  The original emphasis of ST accounts on pretence is reminiscent of  Quine ’ s (1960) view that 
indirect quotation involves an  ‘ essentially dramatic act ’ in which we project ourselves into the 
speaker ’ s state of mind. ST ’ s emphasis on similarity of cognitive resources as the basis of third-
person mindreading is reminiscent of the appeal to  Verstehen  (a non-causal understanding of 
an agent ’ s reasons) and  Einfühlung  (empathetic understanding) by late 19th century German 
philosophers and psychologists, some of whom endorsed the methodological dualism between 
the natural sciences and the humanities. Cf.  Currie, 1998; Goldman, 1989, 1992, 2006; 
Gordon, 1986, 1992; Heal, 1986 . For informative discussion, see  Nichols and Stich, 2003 . 
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scope of ST approaches to human mindreading and strengthen its empirical basis; 
it would also suggest that a fairly elementary mechanism in the motor cognition of 
non-human primates might constitute the neural basis or a phylogenetic precursor 
of human mindreading. In 1998, Vittorio Gallese (one of the cognitive 
neuroscientists who discovered MNs) and Alvin Goldman (one of the philosophical 
advocates of ST approaches to mindreading) published an inﬂ uential paper that 
linked the activity of MNs to mindreading for the ﬁ rst time by adopting an ST 
approach to mindreading and arguing that MNs are instances of neural simulation. 
 Gallese and Goldman ’ s (1998 , p. 498) conjecture was that  ‘ MNs represent a 
primitive version, or possibly a precursor in phylogeny, of a simulation heuristic 
that might underlie mindreading ’ . On this view, MNs would be a neural basis and 
a phylogenetic precursor of mindreading because the former is a resonance 
mechanism and the latter is enhanced by neural similarity. 
 MNs were ﬁ rst discovered in monkeys. The evidence does not unequivocally 
show that monkeys engage in mindreading tasks. 14 Could MNs constitute a 
primitive version of a mental simulation heuristic, as Gallese and Goldman 
conjecture? Since most early ST approaches to mindreading appealed to the 
concept of pretence, one obvious challenge for Gallese and Goldman ’ s ambitious 
research program is to show that both pretence and interpersonal mirroring, 
exempliﬁ ed by MNs, are instances of mental simulation. This is the challenge to 
which I turn in the present section. There are two different strategies for 
implementing  Gallese and Goldman ’ s (1998) research program and, as I shall 
shortly argue, they part company on how exactly to ﬁ ll the details of this 
program. 
 2.1 Two Meanings of  ‘ Simulation ’ 
 At the core of ST accounts of mindreading is the view that pretence is an instance 
of mindreading.  Gallese and Goldman (1998) were the ﬁ rst to propose that 
mirroring processes may be novel instances of mental simulation. However, the 
word  ‘ simulation ’ has been used in two different scientiﬁ c contexts with different 
meanings. Thus, the notion of mental simulation could be broadened in two 
slightly different ways, emphasizing one or other of the two meanings. 15 
 The word  ‘ simulation ’ is widely used in computer science to mean, roughly, 
 ‘ modeling ’ and/or  ‘ computation ’ . This sense of  ‘ simulation ’ is the one recently 
used by computational theorists of action, who have developed so-called  ‘ internal 
models ’ of action (cf.  Blakemore  et al. , 2000; Jeannerod, 2001; Miall, 2003; 
Wolpert, 1997; Wolpert and Gharamani, 2000; Wolpert  et al. , 2001 ). The English 
word  ‘ simulation ’ also derives from the Latin verb  simulare ,  ‘ to imitate ’ (or  ‘ to 
 14  Povinelli and Vonk, 2004; Tomasello and Call, 1997 . 
 15  The richness (or looseness) of the meaning of  ‘ simulation ’ has led  Nichols and Stich (2003 , 
p. 134) to conclude that  ‘ the term has become quite useless. It picks out no natural or 
theoretically interesting category ’ . For a response, see  Goldman, 2006 , p. 35. 
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duplicate ’ ), and the Latin adjective  similis ,  ‘ similar ’ , and this gives rise to a second, 
 ‘ similarity ’ sense. 16 Since the crucial assumption of pretence-based ST approaches 
has been that third-person mindreading is based on psychological similarity 
between the mindreader and her psychological target, the most relevant meaning 
of  ‘ simulation ’ for pretence-based ST approaches to mindreading would seem to 
be the  similarity  meaning. 17 
 However,  Goldman (2006 , pp. 35-39) points out that there is an important 
difference between the notion of simulation and such notions as similarity and 
duplication: whereas the latter are symmetrical, the former is not. Following 
 Goldman (2006 , p. 37), I shall assume that process  P  can only simulate process  P ’ 
if  P  has the function of duplicating  P ’ (in the relevant respects). 18 
 2.2 Pretence 
 Pretence-theoretic accounts of third-person mindreading satisfy the ST assumption 
that third-person mindreading is an attempted duplication of another ’ s psychological 
life based on similarity between their relevant cognitive processes. A mindreader 
can use her shared cognitive resources  ‘ off-line ’ for purposes of imaginative 
pretence. 19 For example, if the task is to predict another ’ s decision, then on ST 
accounts, a mindreader creates in her own mind so-called  ‘ pretend ’ beliefs and 
desires, whose contents are expected to be relevantly similar to those of the person 
whose decision she is trying to predict. She then feeds these pretend beliefs and 
desires as inputs to her own decision-making mechanism, and by running this 
mechanism  ‘ off-line ’ , is able to mentally represent a pretend decision that is likely 
to be relevantly similar to the other person ’ s. Of course, she does not act on the 
basis of this representation, but it enables her to form a belief about the other 
person ’ s decision. 20 
 According to  Goldman (2006) , mental simulation may be either intrapersonal 
(involving simulation of one ’ s own psychological state) or interpersonal (involving 
simulation of another ’ s psychological state). Pretence-theoretic accounts apply to 
both intrapersonal and interpersonal mental simulation. Third-person mindreading 
tasks would qualify as interpersonal mental simulation, while visual and motor 
imagery tasks would be instances of intrapersonal mental simulation. 21 There is 
 16  Cf.  Goldman, 2006 , pp. 35-36. 
 17  In her seminal paper,  Heal (1986) used  ‘ replication ’ for  ‘ simulation ’ and  Goldman (2006 , ch. 
2) is very explicit on this point. 
 18  Any appeal to similarity (or resemblance) must specify which are the  relevant  respects. But 
I shall not press ST theorists of mindreading on this point here. 
 19  Cf.  Currie, 1998 ; Goldman, 1986, 1992;  Gordon, 1986; Heal, 1986 . 
 20  Cf.  Stich and Nichols, 1992 . 
 21  Cf.  Currie (1995) and  Currie and Ravenscroft (1997) on mental visual imagery and mental 
motor imagery, respectively. To my knowledge, no advocate of pretence-based accounts of 
mindreading suggests that intrapersonal mental simulation sub-serves ﬁ rst-person mindreading 
tasks (i.e. results in beliefs about one ’ s own psychological properties or psychological 
self-knowledge). 
© 2008 The Author
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
 Mirror Neurons and Human Social Cognition   199 
evidence that the primary visual system is activated in mental visual imagery tasks 
(where one imagines seeing something). If so, then such tasks would involve the 
intrapersonal creation of a neural similarity with some of the brain activities 
underlying visual perception. According to pretence-theoretic accounts, in mental 
visual imagery, the visual system is used off-line: it takes pretend inputs from 
memory (as opposed to retinal inputs) and produces as a pretend output a visual 
image (as opposed to a visual percept). 22 
 2.3 Differences Between Mirroring and Pretence 
 From the ﬁ rst, the standard view among MN theorists has been that, although an 
observer does not (or need not) execute the observed action, the activity of MNs 
in her brain matches the activity of MNs in the agent ’ s brain. MN theorists have 
emphasized the  congruence  between the motor and perceptual properties of MNs 
(or the replicative character of interpersonal mirroring). If the function of 
interpersonal mirroring is indeed to replicate brain activity, then interpersonal 
mirroring would qualify as another instance of mental simulation on the ground 
that its function is to generate similarity of brain activity across two individuals. 
 However, as noticed by  Gallagher (2007) and recognized by  Goldman (2006) , 
there are at least two relevant differences between mirroring as exempliﬁ ed by 
MNs and either intrapersonal or interpersonal pretence. First, whereas the former 
is automatic, involuntary and non-conscious, most instances of both intrapersonal 
and interpersonal pretence are highly controlled, voluntary and conscious. 
Secondly, successful pretence involves the endogenous creation of a resemblance 
relation between two mental states (of the same mind or two different minds). By 
contrast, in interpersonal mirroring processes, the activity of one individual ’ s brain 
is exogenously caused by the activity of another individual ’ s brain. The interpersonal 
resemblance (or resonance) between brain activities achieved by interpersonal 
mirroring is thus reminiscent of a process of motor contagion. 23 
 To sum up, the discovery of MNs creates a challenge for ST accounts of 
mindreading. It offers the opportunity to extend the class of mechanisms potentially 
relevant to the ability to engage in third-person mindreading tasks. But then ST 
accounts must accommodate the signiﬁ cant differences between pretence and 
 22  In motor imagery tasks, one imagines performing an action without overtly executing it. 
There is much evidence that the primary motor system is active in such tasks. Cf.  Jeannerod, 
1994, 1997 ; and  Pacherie, 2000 , among many sources. Interestingly,  Sirigu and Duhamel 
(2001) found dissociations in both healthy subjects and brain-damaged patients between 
visual imagery (or so-called  ‘ third-person ’ tasks) and motor imagery (or so-called  ‘ ﬁ rst-
person ’ tasks). Cf. section 4.3. 
 23  Motor contagion is the causal process whereby the perception of another ’ s behavior 
automatically causes the perceiver to exemplify the perceived behavior. For example, the 
process whereby infants are caused to cry by perceiving other infants ’ cries is an instance of 
motor contagion. So is yawning in human adults, cf.  Provine, 1989 . But one question that 
arises is: at which level in the representation of a complex observed behavior does motor 
contagion apply? See the end of section 3.2 for some discussion. 
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mirroring within a single generic concept of mental simulation without losing the 
insights of pretence-theoretic accounts of mindreading. I shall consider two 
available strategies for doing this. 
 2.4  ‘ Embodied Simulation ’ 
 One strategy, suggested by  Gallese (2003, 2004, 2005 ),  Gallese and Metzinger 
(2003) and  Gallese and Lakoff (2005) , involves embedding the notion of mental 
simulation within the fast growing research program of so-called  ‘ embodied 
cognition ’ . Advocates of embodied cognition reject the classical computational-
representational view of human cognition, with its view of the human mind as a 
 ‘ disembodied ’ Turing machine or a syntactic engine manipulating symbols 
according to syntactic rules. What  Gallese (2003, 2004, 2005) ,  Gallese and Lakoff 
(2005) and  Gallese and Metzinger (2003) mean by  ‘ embodied simulation ’ is an 
 ‘ automatic, unconscious and pre-reﬂ exive ’ process with very wide potential 
application, which is seen as underlying our  ‘ general capacity of predicting 
upcoming sensory events ’ and our mastery of concepts. Embodied simulation is 
described as  ‘ a basic functional mechanism of our brain ’ , which plays  ‘ a major role 
in our epistemic approach to the world ’ by enabling us  ‘ to model reality ’ ; its 
function is  ‘ the modeling of objects, agents and events ’ , i.e.  ‘ modeling the 
interactions between a situated organism and its environment ’ . 
 In particular,  Gallese and Lakoff ’ s (2005 , p. 3) explicit purpose is to provide a 
 ‘ testable embodied theory of concepts  … capable of reconciling both concrete and 
abstract concepts within a uniﬁ ed framework ’ . Embodied simulation is thus seen 
as encompassing, but going well beyond,  ‘ our understanding of interpersonal 
relations ’ . For example,  Gallese and Lakoff (2005 , p. 15) surmise that the activity 
of  ‘ canonical neurons ’ (described in section 1.1 above) could  ‘ underpin basic-level 
categories of objects ’ by  ‘ bringing together ’ their  ‘ perceptual and motor properties ’ . 
An obvious challenge for this view is to determine what could be the  ‘ motor 
programmes that deﬁ ne the prototypical interaction ’ with instances of the basic-
level concepts such as CAT, TREE or STAR. 24 
 Thus, one important question for the  ‘ embodied simulation ’ strategy is: to what 
extent does embodied simulation involve motor processes?  Gallagher (2007), Jacob 
and Jeannerod (2005) and  Mahon and Caramazza (2005) argue that it does. For 
example, Mahon and Caramazza interpret the embodied simulation strategy 
(defended by  Gallese and Lakoff, 2005 ) as involving the two-part claim that motor 
production processes underlie both the recognition of visually presented actions 
and the representation of conceptual knowledge of objects and actions. They 
provide neuropsychological evidence against the ﬁ rst part of this claim, based on 
double dissociations between human patients with apraxia but without pantomime 
 24  Bloom (1996) also offers convincing evidence against the claim that the contents of artifact 
concepts (e.g. CHAIR) could arise from the  ‘ convergence of gestalt object perception  … 
and motor programmes that deﬁ ne the prototypical interaction with the object ’ . 
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agnosia — who cannot use tools correctly, but can recognize actions and/or 
pantomimes involving use of tools — and those with pantomime agnosia but 
without apraxia, for whom the reverse is true. They also argue that a double 
dissociation between optic ataxic patients (who are impaired in visually guided 
actions of prehension, but whose visual recognitional abilities are preserved) and 
visual form agnosic patients (for whom the reverse is true) is evidence against the 
second part of the claim, that motor production processes underlie the visual 
recognition of objects. 25 
 Gallagher (2007) , who accepts a so-called  ‘ enactivist ’ view of the perception of 
human actions while rejecting a simulation-based account of mindreading, seems 
committed to the claim that all mindreading involves some motor processes. 
According to enactivist accounts, to perceive an object is to act upon it, to know 
how to act on it, or to know the sensory consequences of one ’ s own actions 
towards it (cf.  O ’ Regan and Noë, 2001 and  Noë, 2004 ). 26 Unlike the visual 
perception of an inanimate graspable object, however, the perception of a human 
action causes a neural process of mirroring. 27 Now, on Gallagher ’ s view, mirroring 
(or  ‘ neural resonance ’ ) processes triggered by the perception of another ’ s action are 
straightforward perceptual processes, but they do not involve simulation. On the 
one hand, he accepts a perceptual model of interpersonal understanding on which 
an agent ’ s psychological state (e.g. his intention) can be directly perceived: by 
perceiving a human agent act, we directly perceive his intention. On the other 
hand, such a perceptual process is a motor process because, on the enactive account, 
the perception of a human action — like the perception of anything else — is a 
motor process. 28 
 All this raises a problem for  Gallese ’ s (2003, 2004, 2005) version of embodied 
simulation. On the one hand,  Gallese (2005) and  Gallese  et al.  (1999) have 
expressed explicit reservations towards the two-visual systems model of primate 
vision, according to which there is a dichotomy between the visual perception of 
graspable objects and visually guided actions directed towards these objects. As 
 Gallese  et al.  (1999) put it,  ‘ it is our suggestion that action is one of the founding 
principles of our knowledge of the world ’ . This strongly suggests that they endorse 
the enactivist account of the visual perception of objects. If so, then it would seem 
that, for them, what makes processes of embodied simulation  embodied  is precisely 
that they  are  motor processes. 
 25  See  Milner and Goodale, 1995 and  Jacob and Jeannerod, 2003 for slightly different versions 
of the two-visual systems model of human vision. The fact that some apraxic patients, who 
cannot use a tool correctly, are not impaired in their conceptual knowledge of tools, is also 
difﬁ cult to reconcile with a motor theory of the conceptual representations of tools. 
 26  In  Jacob, 2006 , I argue that the enactive conception of perception is hard to reconcile with 
the evidence for the two-visual systems model of human vision. 
 27  As I said in section 1, the perception of a graspable object triggers the activity of  ‘ canonical ’ 
neurons located in the ventral premotor cortex. 
 28  For discussion of Gallagher ’ s enactive account of the perception of another ’ s action, see my 
criticism in section 4.2 of  Blakemore and Decety ’ s (2001) appeal to forward models of action. 
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 On the other hand,  Gallese (2003, p. 169; 2004) is very explicit that  ‘ embodied 
simulation ’ should not be  ‘ conﬁ ned to the domain of motor control ’ , which 
 Goldman (2004) interprets as implying that mirroring processes are not restricted 
to motor cognition.  Gallese (2003, 2004) mentions two kinds of evidence for the 
claim that not all mirroring processes are motor processes, only one of which is 
relevant here. The relevant piece of evidence is based on brain imaging in humans 
showing that the same brain area involved in the ﬁ rst-person experience of some 
basic emotion (e.g. disgust) is also active when an observer recognizes the facial 
expression of another person experiencing the same emotion. 29 The other piece of 
evidence — which in my view is irrelevant — is that mental visual imagery does not 
involve motor processes. This is true, and relevant to the claim that not all mental 
simulation processes are motor processes. However, it is irrelevant to the claim 
that not all mirroring processes are motor processes, since mental visual imagery is 
an instance of pretence, not mirroring. 
 Interestingly,  Gallese (2003 , p. 168) links his notion of embodied simulation to 
so-called  ‘ internal forward models of action ’ used by computational theorists of 
action (see section 2.1). On this construal, embodied simulation might be what 
enables me to predict, in accordance with forward models of action, the sensory 
consequences of my  ‘ impending act ’ of reaching for and grasping a glass of water 
(e.g. that if I lift the glass of water lying on the table, the glass will move upwards 
and my present visual representation of the glass as lying on the table will need 
updating). But as I shall argue in the last section, in accordance with forward 
models of action, embodied simulation so conceived could enable an agent to 
predict the sensory consequences of his own impending acts only if he is aware of 
his own motor command by means of a so-called  ‘ efference copy ’ (of his motor 
instruction). 30 Unlike an agent, however, an observer is not aware of the agent ’ s 
motor instruction by means of an efference copy. If so, then it is far from clear 
how embodied simulation could also be the process whereby the activity of MNs 
in an observer ’ s brain generates predictions about the sensory consequences of 
another agent ’ s impending motor act. 
 2.5 The Distinction Between Lower-Level and Higher-Level 
Mindreading Tasks 
 The alternative strategy, recommended by  Goldman (2006) , is to stick to the 
pretence-based ST assumption that what underlies mindreading is psychological 
similarity. On this strategy, the relevant differences between pretence and mirroring 
can be accommodated by treating pretence as a so-called  ‘ higher-level ’ mindreading 
 29  I shall not evaluate the relevance of this evidence for the claim that not all mirroring processes 
are motor processes here. But so far, I remain unconvinced. For a detailed analysis, cf. 
 Goldman and Sripada, 2005 and  Gallese  et al. , 2004 and  Gallese ’ s (2004) discussion at  http://
www.interdisciplines.org/mirror/papers/1 
 30  For details, see section 4.2. 
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process and mirroring as a  ‘ lower-level ’ one. Arguably, the distinction between 
higher-level and lower-level mindreading processes depends on the extent to 
which the success of a mindreading task requires what  Goldman (2006) calls 
 ‘ quarantining ’ one ’ s own mental representations or what  Leslie (2000), Leslie and 
Polizzi (1998) and  Saxe  et al.  (2004) call  ‘ inhibitory control ’ . The more inhibitory 
control is required, the more a mindreading task will count as a higher-level task, 
and the less inhibitory processing is required, the more it will count as a lower-
level task. 31 For example, providing a correct answer to many so-called  ‘ false belief ’ 
tasks requires inhibiting one ’ s own correct belief (about e.g. the location of some 
relevant object) (cf.  Bloom and German, 2000 and  Hauser, 2003 ). 
 To some extent, what is known about the brain areas involved in mindreading 
and the development of mindreading abilities in children corroborates this 
conceptual distinction. Evidence from brain imaging in healthy human adults and 
autistic individuals suggests that reasoning about beliefs and representing goals, 
intentions and emotions are subserved by different brain areas (cf.  Saxe, 2005 and 
 Saxe  et al. , 2004 ). Evidence from developmental psychology suggests that toddlers 
and even infants can represent an agent ’ s immediate goal, which  Searle (1983) calls 
his  ‘ intention in action ’ and which I shall call his  ‘ motor intention ’ . Although very 
recent evidence from  Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) suggests that 15-month-old 
infants can represent an agent ’ s false beliefs, it seems that much younger infants can 
represent an agent ’ s goal or (motor) intention. For example,  Woodward (1998) 
and  Woodward  et al.  (2001) habituated ﬁ ve- to eight-month-old infants to seeing 
a reach-and-grasp hand movement. The fact that the infants looked longer when 
the target of prehension changed than when the path of the hand movement 
changed suggests that the infants ’ perceptual representation of a human voluntary 
transitive action involves a selective slot for the target of the action. 
 According to  Saxe  et al.  (2004 , pp. 104-105), much of the time when toddlers 
explicitly represent an agent ’ s volitional state (intention or desire), they rely on 
their own knowledge of the world and do not represent the agent ’ s beliefs about 
the world. Although healthy human adults can readily explain a transitive (target-
directed) hand action by representing the agent ’ s (true or false) belief together with 
his desire and/or intention, it is often possible to make sense of the observed 
action by relying on one ’ s own current perception of the world and representing 
the goal of the action or the agent ’ s motor intention without explicitly representing 
the agent ’ s true belief. Whether or not a child endorses the content of an agent ’ s 
volitional state, the agent ’ s observed movements towards a target, together with 
the agent ’ s eye-direction, can be taken as reliable cues to the object of his volitional 
state. Arguably, there is no such cue to the content of an agent ’ s beliefs. If so, then 
representing an agent ’ s (motor) intention (directed towards a target) — as opposed 
to representing an agent ’ s false belief — would count as a lower-level mindreading 
task. Suppose that pretence serves higher-level mindreading tasks and that mirroring 
 31  On this account, the distinction is not a classiﬁ catory one, but a matter of degree. 
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serves lower-level tasks. Then the resulting overall picture of simulation-based 









 Figure  1  Goldman ’ s (2006) picture of mental simulation 32 
 32  Goldman (2004, 2006) also assumes that not all mirroring is motor mirroring for reasons 
having to do with the role of mirroring in recognizing others ’ emotions. But I cannot 
examine this further claim here. 
 Representing an agent ’ s intention might be classiﬁ ed as a lower-level mindreading 
task in comparison with representing her belief. If the activity of MNs in an 
observer ’ s brain enables an observer to represent the agent ’ s intention by internally 
replicating the agent ’ s observed movements, then mirroring would contribute to 
some third-person mindreading tasks. The question then arises whether motor 
resonance is sufﬁ cient or even necessary for representing an agent ’ s intention. 
 3. Representing an Agent ’ s Intentions 
 Since different mindreading tasks make different computational demands, it is 
conceivable that different tasks are performed by different mindreading capacities. 
For example, as noticed above, representing an agent ’ s false belief about the 
location of an object requires inhibiting one ’ s own true belief. As  Umiltà ’ s (2001) 
experiment (discussed in section 1) shows, when a monkey perceives a hand 
action, MNs in its premotor cortex are only active if a target is present and the 
monkey knows it. As  Saxe (2005) has argued, the fact that MNs remain silent 
when a target is missing and the monkey knows it shows that the activity of MNs 
is unsuitable, in these circumstances, for the task of representing the content of an 
agent ’ s false belief that there is a target. Plausibly however, the ability to represent 
an agent ’ s false belief should not be taken as a pre-requisite for the ability to 
represent her intention. Since representing an agent ’ s intention is a different task 
from representing her false belief (if she has one), MN activity could still enable an 
observer to represent an agent ’ s intention. 
 Now, to see what is involved in representing an agent ’ s intention, suppose that 
I observe a conspeciﬁ c reach for and grasp a red apple with her right hand: which 
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constituents of the observed action are likely to be represented by a process of 
internal replication (or motor simulation)? In grasping the red apple with her right 
hand, was the agent ’ s goal to eat it? To give it to her little daughter? To throw it 
away? Or to display it in order to draw it? Suppose that, by matching the agent ’ s 
hand movement onto my motor system, I can mentally rehearse her reach-to-
grasp movement: this might enable me to know what it is like for the agent to 
grasp and feel the apple within the palm of her right hand. As this example 
illustrates, the notion of a  goal  is more abstract than the notion of a  target . Perceiving 
the target of an agent ’ s act of grasping is a cue — but no more than a cue — to 
representing the agent ’ s goal. So the question is: could the activity of MNs in an 
observer ’ s brain generate a representation of the fact that the agent ’ s goal was e.g. 
to display the apple in order to draw it (as opposed to eating it, giving it to her 
little daughter, or throwing it away)? 
 3.1 The Hierarchical Structure of Intentions 
 Philosophers have long recognized the hierarchical structure of action and drawn 
a distinction between basic and non-basic acts (see, e.g.  Goldman, 1970 ). Unlike 
a basic act, a non-basic act is one about which it makes sense to ask  how  the agent 
performed it. For example, the non-basic action of killing a victim could be 
performed by several distinct more basic acts, such as pressing the trigger of a gun 
aimed at the victim, or dropping a poison into the victim ’ s glass of wine. 33 
Following  Anscombe (1957) and  Searle (1983) , philosophers have also distinguished 
the direction of ﬁ t of beliefs from that of intentions: beliefs have a mind-to-world 
direction of ﬁ t and intentions a world-to-mind direction of ﬁ t. A belief is true if 
the state of affairs represented obtains (or is a fact) and false otherwise. By contrast, 
an intention represents a possible non-actual state of affairs: the intention will be 
satisﬁ ed if the agent ’ s action turns the possible state of affairs into a fact. 
 Typically, an agent does not have one and only one intention in performing an 
action: rather, she has a network of nested intentions. For example, suppose that 
an agent has what philosophers, following  Searle (1983) , call the  ‘ prior ’ intention 
to turn the light on, because she wants to read a book and she believes that unless 
she turns the light on she will not have enough light to read. Turning the light on 
is a non-basic act since it can be achieved by means of several distinct more basic 
motor acts (including, for instance, uttering an English sentence requesting an 
English-speaking conspeciﬁ c to do it). Let us suppose that, in the circumstances, 
the agent, who has the prior intention to turn the light on, forms what I shall call 
the  ‘ motor ’ intention to press the electrical switch down with her right index 
ﬁ nger. By pressing the switch, she will turn the light on. An agent ’ s motor intention 
 33  Representing the kinematic properties of a bodily movement is representing a lower-level 
property of an act than representing the goal of an action. See  Jeannerod ’ s (1994, 1997) 
distinction between the semantic and pragmatic representations of an action and see also 
 Jacob and Jeannerod, 2003 . 
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is in essence a motor command (or instruction): it stands to the agent ’ s prior 
intention in roughly the same relation as her more basic motor act stands to her 
less basic act. 
 The agent ’ s prior intention arises from her beliefs and desires: unless it had some 
conceptual content, it could not interact appropriately with her beliefs and desires. 
By contrast, the job of an agent ’ s motor intention is to guide and monitor her 
bodily movements. So an agent ’ s motor intention, unlike her prior intention, has 
non-conceptual content. Clearly, one and the same motor intention e.g. to press 
the electrical switch down with one ’ s right index ﬁ nger, could be at the service of 
different (even incompatible) prior intentions. For example, depending on the 
agent ’ s beliefs about the circumstances (such as whether the light is on or off), one 
and the same motor intention could serve the agent ’ s prior intention either to turn 
the light  on  or to turn it  off . In other words, motor intentions stand to prior 
intentions in a one-to-many relation. Whereas an agent is aware of her prior 
intention, she is hardly aware of her motor intention. 
 The need to recognize the hierarchical structure of human intentions is made 
more pressing by the fact that not all human actions are directed towards inanimate 
targets: some are directed towards conspeciﬁ cs. So as well as distinguishing between 
an agent ’ s motor and prior intentions, we must distinguish an agent ’ s non-social 
intentions from her social intentions, i.e. her intentions to act towards conspeciﬁ cs, 
which, unlike inanimate targets, can act back. What I call a  ‘ social intention ’ is an 
intention to affect a conspeciﬁ c ’ s behavior. Since humans often act out of their 
mental representations, a social intention may be an intention to modify a 
conspeciﬁ c ’ s mental representations. Clearly, much human social cognition (in the 
sense of  Blakemore  et al. , 2004 ) depends on the human ability to represent an 
agent ’ s social intention. 
 An agent ’ s social intention, like his prior intentions, stand to his motor intentions 
in a many-one relation. This is illustrated by the case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde 
(imagined by  Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005 ). Dr Jekyll is a renowned surgeon who 
performs appendectomies on his anesthetized patients. Mr Hyde is a dangerous 
sadist who performs exactly the same hand movements on his non-anesthetized 
victims. It turns out that Mr Hyde is no other than Dr Jekyll. Dr Jekyll alias Mr 
Hyde may well execute twice the same motor sequence whereby he grasps his 
scalpel and applies it to the same bodily part of two different persons (one 
anesthetized, the other suitably paralyzed). If so, then Dr Jekyll ’ s motor intention 
will match Mr Hyde ’ s. However, Dr Jekyll ’ s social intention clearly differs from 
Mr Hyde ’ s: whereas the former intends to improve his patient ’ s medical condition, 
the latter intends to derive pleasure from his victim ’ s pain. 
 Finally, some of an agent ’ s social intentions are communicative intentions, i.e. 
as  Grice (1989) and others have emphasized, intentions to impart information by 
virtue of their own recognition by the addressee. 34 For example, consider Jill ’ s 
 34  See in particular  Sperber and Wilson, 1986 . 
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non-verbal communicative intention to inform Bill of her desire to leave the party 
by ostensively pointing her index ﬁ nger at her wristwatch in front of him. By 
recognizing her communicative intention, Bill will acquire the belief that Jill wants 
to leave the party (and he will only acquire this belief if he does recognize Jill ’ s 
intention). Jill may, however, execute the very same ostensive bodily movement 
if she wants Bill to believe instead that her watch is inaccurate. If so, then Jill may 
hire one and the same motor intention to serve two distinct communicative 
intentions. 
 By mentally rehearsing the agent ’ s perceived movement of pressing the switch 
with her right index ﬁ nger, an observer could perhaps represent the agent ’ s motor 
intention. But given that there is no unique mapping from the agent ’ s motor 
intention to her prior intention, the observer would not thereby be enabled to 
represent the content of the agent ’ s prior intention. Similarly, by matching onto 
her own motor repertoire the hand movement whereby Dr Jekyll alias Mr Hyde 
grasps his scalpel, an observer might be able to represent his motor intention. But 
this matching would not enable her to discriminate Dr Jekyll ’ s social intention 
from Mr Hyde ’ s. Finally, by matching Jill ’ s ostensive ﬁ nger movement onto his 
own motor repertoire, Bill may represent her motor intention. But again this 
matching would not enable him to choose which of Jill ’ s two potential 
communicative intentions her ﬁ nger movement is supposed to convey. 
 Furthermore, as argued by  Jacob and Jeannerod (2005) , evidence from 
developmental psychology suggests that the matching of an agent ’ s observed 
movements onto the observer ’ s motor repertoire might not even be  necessary  for 
representing some of his prior intentions. It has long been known that perceiving 
the relative motions of geometrical stimuli with no human or animal aspects (e.g. 
circles and triangles) can prompt normal adults to ascribe emotions and social 
intentions to the moving stimuli, and describe their motions using intentional 
verbs such as  ‘ chase ’ ,  ‘ corner ’ ,  ‘ attack ’ ,  ‘ caress ’ ,  ‘ comfort ’ and so on (cf. Heider and 
Simmel, 1944;  Castelli  et al. , 2000 ). There is also evidence that 9-month-old 
infants automatically ascribe goals to moving geometrical stimuli ( Gergely  et al. , 
1995; Csibra  et al. , 1999 ). Recently, when shown a triangle and a square whose 
motions were automatically perceived by adults as, respectively,  ‘ helping ’ and 
 ‘ hindering ’ a circle move up a slope, 12-month-old toddlers exhibited a preference 
for the former over the latter (cf.  Kuhlmeier  et al ., 2003 ). If so, then it is highly 
unlikely that human infants represent the intentions of moving geometrical 
stimuli by a process of motor simulation of (or motor resonance with) the latter ’ s 
non-biological motion. 
 Note that while a healthy human agent is fully aware of the conceptual content 
of her own prior intention, she is hardly aware of the non-conceptual content of 
her own motor intention (unless a mismatch occurs in the course of her voluntary 
action). An adult observer may routinely take a representation of the agent ’ s motor 
intention as input to the computation of hierarchically more abstract representations 
of the agent ’ s prior, social and/or communicative intentions. Whereas a mindreader 
is barely aware (if at all) of the content of his representation of the agent ’ s motor 
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intention, he is acutely aware of the content of his representation of the agent ’ s 
prior intention. What constitutes the content of the relevant mindreader ’ s belief is 
the content of his representation of the agent ’ s prior intention, not the content of 
his representation of the agent ’ s motor intention. If the crucial property of MN 
activity is resonance, then it can at best deliver a (non-conscious) representation of 
the agent ’ s motor intention (or motor command), i.e. the tip of the hierarchical 
iceberg of an agent ’ s nested intentions. Motor resonance on its own lacks the 
resources to bridge the gap between representing an agent ’ s motor intention and 
representing her higher-level intentions. The question is: when motor resonance 
is indeed used, what further cognitive resources will enable a mindreader to move 
from a non-conscious representation of the agent ’ s motor intention to a conscious 
representation of her prior intention, and thereby form a belief about the content 
of that prior intention? 
 3.2 The New Model of Chains of Logically Related MNs 
 Recently, MN theorists have addressed some of these questions and designed 
experiments whose goal is to demonstrate that the activity of MNs extends beyond 
the mere recognition of a motor act to the representation of an agent ’ s intention. 
In their own terms, the purpose of the experiments is to show that MN activity 
enables an observer not merely to respond to the question of  what  the agent is 
doing, but also of  why  he is doing it by representing what they call (misleadingly, 
I think) the agent ’ s  ‘ global ’ intention. 35 
 In a series of elegant experiments in which a single motor act is embedded into 
two more complex actions,  Fogassi  et al.  (2005) recorded MNs in the inferior 
parietal lobule (IPL) of monkeys during the execution and perception of acts of 
reaching-to-grasp a target in order either to eat it or to place it into a container. 
In the motor task, the container could be located either near the target or near the 
animal ’ s mouth. Thus, one and the same act of grasping could be followed by 
either arm ﬂ exion (for eating or placing in a container near the mouth) or arm 
abduction (for placing near the target). In motor tasks,  Fogassi  et al.  (2005) found 
that the activity of 65% of MNs that ﬁ re during execution of grasping is modulated 
by the more complex action of which it is a part. In particular, MNs ﬁ re selectively 
when grasping is part of placing, whether the placing is near the target or near the 
mouth (and irrespective of the kinematic differences between arm abduction and 
arm ﬂ exion). 
 They also recorded MNs in IPL when the animal sees an experimenter grasp 
a piece of food in order either to eat it or to place it into a container. They 
found that two thirds of recorded MNs ﬁ re selectively during observation of 
the act of grasping according to whether the grasping was for eating or for 
 35  As I argued in the previous section, an agent does not entertain a  global  intention; rather, she 
entertains a hierarchically organized set of intentions, each of which plays a distinctive causal 
role in explaining some feature of her behavior. 
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placing. Finally they found that 84% of MNs exhibit the same speciﬁ city in 
both motor and perceptual tasks. As they recognize, two factors may help the 
monkey to discriminate between grasping for eating and grasping for placing: 
one is whether or not the object grasped is food; and the other is whether or 
not a container is present in the context of the perceived action. However, 
both are purely perceptual cues, whose processing as such would fail to elicit 
the activity of MNs. 
 In an fMRI (imaging study),  Iacoboni  et al.  (2005) used the same design and 
showed healthy human subjects pairs of ﬁ lms divided into three conditions. In the 
Context condition, subjects saw objects (a teapot, a mug, cookies, etc.) arranged 
as if either before tea (the  ‘ drinking ’ Context) or after tea (the  ‘ cleaning ’ Context). 
In the Action condition, subjects saw a human hand grasp a mug using either a 
precision grip or a whole-hand prehension (with no contextual elements present). 
In the Intention condition, subjects saw one or other of the two acts of prehension 
embedded in either the drinking context (Intention to drink condition) or the 
cleaning context (Intention to clean condition). 
 Compared to a state of rest (i.e. a blank screen), viewing the Intention condition 
led to the strongest activation in the right inferior frontal areas (known to be rich 
in MNs). In particular, viewing the Intention condition showed a signiﬁ cant 
increase of activation in the right frontal areas as compared with viewing the 
Action condition. Since subjects in the Intention condition (unlike those in the 
Action condition) perceive many graspable objects other than the grasped mug, 
this increased activity could arise from the ﬁ ring of  ‘ canonical ’ neurons, and not 
just of MNs. So in order to disentangle the respective contribution of MNs and 
canonical neurons, the experimenters compared the levels of activity in the 
Intention to drink condition and the Intention to clean condition. They found 
that viewing the Intention to drink condition caused a signiﬁ cantly stronger 
activation of the same brain area than the Intention to clean condition. No such 
difference was found between viewing the drinking (or before tea) Context and 
the cleaning (or after tea) Context.  Iacoboni  et al.  (2005) conclude that viewing the 
Intention to drink condition generates a stronger MN activity than viewing the 
Intention to clean condition. 
 In the framework of section 3.1, the agent can be said to have the motor 
intention either to grasp the mug using full-hand prehension or to grasp it using a 
precision grip. She can also be said to have the prior intention either to drink or 
to clean. The new results reported by MN theorists raise two fundamental issues. 
One is whether these experiments show that the activity of MNs generates a 
representation of an agent ’ s prior intention. The second is whether the observed 
responses could be generated by a (replicative) process of motor resonance. I will 
start with the ﬁ rst issue and suggest that it is questionable for two reasons whether 
these experiments demonstrate that MN activity generates a representation of the 
agent ’ s prior intention. 
 Fogassi  et al. ’ s (2005) experiment shows that when a monkey perceives a single 
motor act of grasping, the activity of MNs in the animal ’ s IPL is modulated by his 
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perception of two factors: whether or not the grasped object is food and whether 
or not a container is present.  Iacoboni  et al. ’ s (2005) experiment shows that the 
presence of contextual cues enhances the activity of inferior frontal areas in humans 
perceiving an act of grasping a mug.  Umiltà  et al. ’ s (2001) experiment (reviewed 
in section 1) showed that when a monkey sees a reach-to-grasp movement, MNs 
in its premotor cortex ﬁ re only if there is a target and the animal knows it. But it 
did not prove that MN activity is responsible for representing the agent ’ s goal (i.e. 
to grasp the target), because the representation of this goal could result from an 
independent purely perceptual representation of the target of the action, based in 
part on the perceptual representation of the object of the agent ’ s visual attention. 
 Fogassi  et al. ’ s (2005) and Iacoboni  et al. ’ s (2005) experiments reveal a correlation 
between enhanced MN activity and the presence of elements that facilitate a 
representation of an agent ’ s prior intention. However, correlation is not causation: 
these experiments do not prove that MN activity  generates  a representation of the 
agent ’ s prior intention, because this representation might derive from the perceptual 
processing of contextual cues.  Fogassi  et al.  (2005) do not rule out the possibility 
that perceptual cues (such as whether the object to be grasped is food and whether 
there is a container) enable the animal to form a perceptual representation of the 
agent ’ s goal prior to perceiving the act of grasping. Nor do  Iacoboni  et al.  (2005) 
rule out the possibility that the perception of contextual cues gives rise to a 
perceptual representation of the agent ’ s intention (e.g. to drink), which would be 
prior to the representation of the agent ’ s motor intention. The enhanced MN 
activity might itself result from the existence of an independent representation of 
the agent ’ s prior intention, rather than generating it. 
 Iacoboni  et al.  (2005) found that the activity in the subjects ’ right inferior frontal 
areas showed a signiﬁ cant bias in favor of the Intention to drink condition over the 
Intention to clean condition. They also report that by making use of their full 
cognitive capacities (of which the right inferior frontal areas are merely a constituent), 
subjects could explicitly represent and verbally report the agent ’ s intention to clean 
as easily as his intention to drink, as a function of contextual cues. Arguably, 
however, there is a gap between the activity of MNs in the subjects ’ right inferior 
frontal areas and their ability to represent a range of alternative intentions as a 
function of contextual cues. Compared with subjects ’ full capacity, the very bias of 
MNs (contained in the inferior frontal areas) for one of the two Intention conditions 
suggests that their contribution to this capacity is sharply limited. 
 I now turn to the question of whether strict motor resonance (or contagion) 
could account for  Fogassi  et al. ’ s (2005) and Iacoboni  et al. ’ s (2005) results. 36 Based 
on earlier experiments (reviewed in section 1), MN activity was supposed to 
enable an observer to mentally match the agent ’ s observed movement onto his 
own motor repertoire. In other words, the most fundamental property of MNs 
 36  I am grateful to the anonymous referee ’ s request for clariﬁ cation of my claim that the new 
model based on chains of logically related MNs is not easy to reconcile with the resonance 
model of MNs (or the strict congruence between their perceptual and motor properties). 
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was taken to be the strict congruence between their motor and perceptual 
properties. The same MNs were supposed to ﬁ re during both the execution and 
the observation of an act of grasping. But as  Iacoboni  et al.  (2005 , p. 533) note, 
 ‘ this property cannot account for the present ﬁ ndings, speciﬁ cally, the difference 
in responses observed between the drinking and cleaning Intention clips ’ . Strict 
congruence (or motor resonance) would require that the same MNs that ﬁ re 
during the execution of a motor act of grasping also ﬁ re during the observation of 
an act of grasping performed by another. However, what the recent experiments 
show is that MNs that ﬁ re in response to the observation of an act of grasping do 
not ﬁ re during the execution of the same motor act: rather, they govern the 
execution of what  Iacoboni  et al.  (2005 , p. 533) call a  ‘ functionally related act ’ (e.g. 
drinking). Instead of mere replication (strict congruence or motor resonance), MN 
theorists now appeal to the idea of  chains  of  ‘ logically related ’ MNs. As  Iacoboni 
et al.  (2005 , p. 533) make clear, however, the relation between pairs of MNs in a 
chain is probabilistic (or inductive), not strictly logical: 
 … the present ﬁ ndings strongly suggest that coding the intention associated 
with the actions of others is based on the activation of a neuronal chain formed 
by mirror neurons coding the observed motor act and by  ‘ logically related ’ 
mirror neurons coding the motor acts that are most likely to follow the 
observed one, given the context. 37 
 To accept the new model based on chains of logically related MNs is to give up the 
assumption of strong congruence between the motor and perceptual properties of 
MNs. In such a chain, MNs coding an observed motor act are supposedly linked to 
 ‘ logically related ’ (or probabilistically related) MNs coding the motor act that is most 
likely to follow its observed immediate predecessor in a given context. In other 
words, MNs in an observer ’ s brain do not strictly speaking resonate with MNs in an 
agent ’ s brain: while the latter control the execution of an act of grasping, the former 
control an act of drinking. Similarly, on the natural assumption that genuine motor 
contagion requires strict congruence between the perceptual and motor properties 
of MNs, acceptance of the new model based on chains of logically related MNs 
generates a discrepancy between motor contagion and the activity of MNs. 
 Blakemore and Frith (2005) report an interesting experiment in which they 
requested human subjects to execute sinusoidal movements with their right arm 
while observing simultaneous arm movements produced by either a human or a 
robot facing the subjects that were either congruent or incongruent with subjects ’ 
own movements.  Blakemore and Frith (2005) found that only observation of 
human (i.e. biological) incongruent arm movements interfered with subjects ’ own 
 37  Cf.  Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2005 . In order to account for the broad congruence between 
the perceptual and the motor properties of some MNs,  Di Pellegrino  et al.  (1992) already 
introduced the concept of  ‘ logically related MNs ’ . 
© 2008 The Author
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
 212   P. Jacob 
arm movements (by generating variance with respect to a base line condition). 
They hypothesize that this interference might be evidence for an underlying 
process of motor contagion. Since the relevant arm movements in this experiment 
are  not  goal directed, if motor contagion is the source of the interference, it is 
likely to relate to the kinematic properties of observed and executed bodily 
movements. The experiment does not show that motor contagion underlies action 
understanding, i.e. the representation of an agent ’ s goal, let alone of her prior 
intention. By contrast, activation of a chain of logically related MNs does not seem 
to constitute a process of genuine motor contagion. Instead of strictly resonating, 
a chain of logically related MNs constitutes a  predictive  mechanism, whose task is to 
enable the observer to predict the agent ’ s most likely next act on the combined 
basis of the observed motor act and contextual cues. Its task is not to enable an 
observer to mentally replicate the agent ’ s observed motor act. 38 
 4. Inverse versus Forward Internal Models of Action 
 MN theorists have recognized the intrinsic limitations of strict motor resonance as 
a mechanism for representing an agent ’ s prior intention: motor resonance could at 
best generate a representation of an agent ’ s motor intention (i.e. motor command). 
They have thus given up on the requirement of strict congruence between the 
motor and perceptual properties of MNs. Since they still adhere to  Gallese and 
Goldman ’ s (1998) conjecture that MN activity underlies mindreading (by enabling 
an observer to represent the agent ’ s intention), they have been led to endorse the 
new model based on chains of logically related MNs. But on the new model, MN 
activity is predictive and one cannot endorse it without giving up the strict resonance 
(or congruence) model of MN activity. I agree that MN activity is predictive, but 
the question to be addressed in this section is: what do MNs predict? 
 4.1 Prediction versus Retrodiction 
 There is a recognizable tension between the new model based on chains of logically 
related MNs and a critical feature of  Gallese and Goldman ’ s (1998) conjecture. 
According to  Gallese and Goldman (1998 , p. 497), the  ‘ internally generated 
 38  There is further evidence that is hard to reconcile with the view that the main property of 
neuronal activity in the human ventral premotor cortex is strict motor resonance. For 
example,  Schubotz and von Cramon (2004) found activations in the ventral premotor cortex 
when subjects saw static arrays of geometrical objects and were asked whether the arrays 
followed some regular order or not. The subjects ’ motor system could not resonate with 
static geometrical stimuli. Furthermore, activations of the human premotor cortex have been 
reported by  Costantini  et al.  (2005) , not only for the observation of bio-mechanically possible 
movements that the subject could perform, but also for bio-mechanically impossible 
movements. Finally, motor facilitation effects during the observation of impossible movements 
have been reported by  Romani  et al.  (2005) . 
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activation ’ of MNs in an agent ’ s brain constitutes  ‘ a plan to execute a certain 
action ’ . By contrast, the  ‘ external activation ’ of MNs is supposed to enable an 
observer to  retrodict  ‘ the target ’ s mental state ’ (i.e. her goal or intention) by  ‘ moving 
backwards from the observed action ’ . The reason why MN activity could only 
enable an observer to retrodict a representation of an agent ’ s intention is that an 
agent ’ s intention is the psychological cause of her movements and hence MN 
activity could only compute a representation of the agent ’ s intention by working 
backwards from the perception of her observable movements. But one cannot 
have it both ways: either MN activity is predictive (in accordance with the new 
model of logically related MNs) or it is retrodictive (in accordance with Gallese 
and Goldman ’ s conjecture). In accordance with the new model, it is, I think, more 
plausible to choose the former option, on which MN activity is predictive. 
 As noted above, MNs were ﬁ rst discovered in the premotor cortex of monkeys. 
If they engage in third-person mindreading tasks at all, monkeys are presumably 
performing lower-level tasks. If and when a non-human primate engages in a one-
to-one social interaction with a conspeciﬁ c, predicting the conspeciﬁ c ’ s next move 
should be a relatively automatic process that directly contributes to the agent ’ s 
decision about which step to take next in her own course of action. Accordingly, 
when considering the potential contribution of mindreading to the inclusive ﬁ tness 
of non-human primates,  Gallese and Goldman (1998 , pp. 495-6) emphasize the 
value of anticipating and predicting a conspeciﬁ c ’ s next move  ‘ which might be 
cooperative, non-cooperative, or even threatening ’ . They do not emphasize the 
value of retrodicting the conspeciﬁ c ’ s prior intention. Arguably, retrodicting an 
agent ’ s prior intention from the perception of his action requires a higher-level 
capacity to inhibit one ’ s own current action. But it is highly dubious whether 
non-human primates have such inhibitory capacities. 
 4.2 Computing an Agent ’ s Intention in Accordance 
with a Forward Model 
 In order for an agent to execute a voluntary action, he must have the resources to 
represent both his prior intention and the motor command suitable to achieving 
his prior intention. In order to understand the agent ’ s action, an observer must also 
represent the agent ’ s prior intention and the motor command (or sequence) used 
by the agent to achieve his goal. 39 Suppose an agent plans and executes a voluntary 
reaching-to-grasp hand action directed towards a target. If we give up the 
assumption of strict congruence between the motor and perceptual properties of 
MNs, the question arises: what brain structures does the agent share with a 
conspeciﬁ c observing him? 
 39  On  Dretske ’ s (1988) componential view of behavior, a goal-directed action is the process 
whereby the agent ’ s intention causes some bodily motor sequence. On this view, a mindreader 
could either predict the motor sequence from a representation of the agent ’ s intention or 
retrodict the agent ’ s intention from the agent ’ s observed motor sequence. 
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 What computational theorists of action ( Blakemore and Decety, 2001; Blakemore 
 et al. , 2000; Miall, 2003; Wolpert, 1997; Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000; Wolpert 
 et al. , 2001 ) call  ‘ internal models ’ of action allow us to make some relevant 
distinctions between the computational resources available, respectively, to an 
agent and to an observer. According to the internal models theory, during the 
execution of a voluntary (or intentional) action, an agent ’ s motor cortex 
simultaneously sends a motor command to the relevant muscles and a copy of this 
motor command to a central system called a  ‘ comparator ’ or a  ‘ motor planner ’ . 
Internal model theorists of action call the copy of the motor command a  ‘ corollary 
discharge ’ or an  ‘ efference copy ’ . Clearly, the efference copy of the motor 
instruction is available to the agent, but not to the observer: only the agent is 
informed of his own agency by the efference copy. 40 
 An agent can, but presumably an observer cannot, take the efference copy of his 
own motor instruction as input and use a  forward  internal model of his own action 
to compute and predict the sensory consequences of his own motor act. Before 
executing his reaching-to-grasp movement, an agent can predict, from the 
efference copy of his own motor command, that if and when he moves his right 
hand forward, grasps the glass with his right hand and lifts it off the table, his visual 
experience will represent the glass as being above the table, not on it. In other 
words, this computation takes a copy of a motor representation as input and 
computes a perceptual representation. 
 Since the seminal work of  von Holst and Mittelstaedt (1950) , forward 
models of action have been used to explain an agent ’ s ability to distinguish the 
sensory consequences of his own self-generated movements from sensory 
changes that are exogenously produced in his environment. They also account 
for the attenuated experience of the sensory consequences of one ’ s own 
actions, as compared to the sensory experience of exogenous changes in one ’ s 
environment: being predictable (from the efference copy of one ’ s motor 
instructions), the sensory consequences of one ’ s own actions are worth less 
perceptual attention than sensory changes exogenously produced (which are 
not predictable). 41 Predicting the sensory consequences of one ’ s own action is 
representing one ’ s immediate goal. Thus, by using a forward internal model of 
his own action an agent can compute a sensory (or perceptual) representation 
of the immediate goal of his action, from the representation of his own motor 
command (coded by the efference copy). 42 
 40  As already mentioned in section 2.4. Much of the internal models of action framework was 
anticipated by  von Holst and Mittelstaedt (1950) , resurrecting ideas of the great vision 
scientist von Helmholtz, whose concern was to explain how the human brain is able to 
discriminate the visual signals produced on the retina respectively by the motion of some 
external moving object and by the endogenously produced movements of the eye. 
 41  This is why one can ’ t tickle oneself, cf.  Blakemore  et al. , 2000 . 
 42  Miall (2003) has explicitly considered how MNs might mimic internal forward models of 
action. 
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 Along similar lines to  Gallese and Goldman (1998), Blakemore and Decety 
(2001) hypothesize that an observer could use a forward internal model of action 
to retrodict an agent ’ s intention from his observed movements. The observer 
would ﬁ rst map the agent ’ s observed movements onto her own set of stored 
predictions of the sensory consequences of her own motor commands. Then, 
moving backwards, she would estimate what motor commands and intention are 
likely to have generated the observed movements. Finally, she would attribute 
these motor commands and this intention to the agent. 43 As noticed by  Csibra 
(2005) , not only would this retrodictive account reverse the ﬂ ow of information 
typical of the computations performed by forward models, but it also severely 
under-estimates the computational complexity of mapping an observed movement 
onto an underlying intention. As I argued in section 3.1, one and the same 
observable movement can serve many different underlying intentions. Of course, 
lacking an efference copy, an observer, unlike the agent, cannot directly compute 
the sensory consequences of the agent ’ s observed action from the efference copy 
of the agent ’ s motor command. Thus, on this view, both the internally generated 
activation of MNs in an agent ’ s brain and the externally generated activation of 
MNs in an observer ’ s brain would contribute to representing the agent ’ s goal; 
however, the computation would be predictive in the former case, and retrodictive 
in the latter case. 
 4.3 Computing Motor Commands in Accordance 
with an Inverse Model 
 As noted above, to have a goal is to represent a non-actual state of affairs, which 
will be turned into an actual state of affairs by one ’ s action. It might seem that 
having a goal is a primitive capacity. However, recent work in cognitive 
neuroscience showing that mental motor imagery can be dissociated from mental 
visual imagery suggests that having a goal may involve not just one, but two 
abilities: the ability to represent the motor command required to perform an act (a 
motor representation) and the ability to represent the sensory consequences of the 
act (a perceptual representation). For example,  Sirigu and Duhamel (2001) 
instructed healthy subjects, who kept their own hands either on their lap or behind 
their back, to imagine rotating either their own left hand (ﬁ rst-person condition) 
or the experimenter ’ s left hand (third-person condition). Mentally rotating one ’ s 
own hand is a motor imagery task; mentally rotating another ’ s hand is a visual 
imagery task. When questioned about the spatial position of the little ﬁ nger on the 
relevant hand after the imagined rotations, subjects responded signiﬁ cantly faster in 
the ﬁ rst-person condition when their hands were on their lap (rather than behind 
their back) and, conversely, in the third-person condition when their hands were 
 43  This model might make sense of  Gallagher ’ s (2007) endorsement of an enactive conception 
of the perception of human action discussed in section 2.4. 
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behind their back (rather than on their lap). Thus, in healthy subjects, processes of 
motor and visual imagery can be selectively facilitated (or impaired). 44 
 Not only are motor imagery and visual imagery dissociable, but the theory of 
internal models of action also enables us to make sense of the twofold nature of 
goals in terms of the computational contrast between forward and inverse models. 
Forward models are used to compute the sensory consequences of the agent ’ s 
action from a representation of the motor command, while inverse models are 
used to compute motor commands suitable to achieving the agent ’ s prior intention, 
given, of course, a prior representation of the agent ’ s prior intention. 
 Now, as MN theorists have emphasized, the fact that MN activity generates 
motor representations of actions does not in itself make MNs suitable for computing 
the sensory consequences of actions. Rather, as  Csibra (2005) has insightfully 
argued, it makes them suitable for computing a representation of the motor 
command required to satisfy the agent ’ s prior intention, in accordance with an 
inverse internal model of action. If so, then it becomes easier to offer a uniﬁ ed 
account of the computation performed by MNs despite the basic asymmetry 
created by the fact that an observer, unlike an agent, lacks an efference copy of 
the agent ’ s motor instruction. In accordance with inverse models of action, MNs 
in an agent ’ s brain would compute the motor commands suitable to achieving the 
agent ’ s prior intention, based on an internally generated representation of this prior 
intention. In accordance with inverse models of actions, MNs in an observer ’ s 
brain would also compute a representation of the motor commands that would 
enable the agent to achieve his prior intention, based on a representation of this 
prior intention derived from perceptual cues (including a representation of the 
target of the agent ’ s visual attention). 
 If the activity of MNs takes a representation of an agent ’ s prior intention as 
input and computes a representation of motor commands suitable to achieving this 
goal, then, of course, it does not generate a representation of the agent ’ s prior 
intention. Rather, the former presupposes the latter. But if so, then, in accordance 
with  Gallese and Goldman ’ s (1998 , p. 496) recommendation (quoted above), MNs 
do enable an observer to predict and anticipate the agent ’ s next move, i.e. his next 
motor sequence. Arguably, in computing an agent ’ s next move (in accordance 
with an inverse model of action and consistent with the lack of an efference copy 
of the agent ’ s motor instructions), the activity of MNs might generate motor 
imagery (as opposed to visual imagery) in the observer ’ s brain. 45 
 On the view of MN activity that I am endorsing, the representation of an agent ’ s 
prior intention, which serves as input to the inverse model, might arise in an 
observer ’ s brain as a result of the activity of the STS, which is reciprocally connected 
 44  Sirigu and Duhamel (2001) further show that patients with, respectively, a parietal lesion and 
a lesion in the inferotemporal structures exhibit opposite impairments in the hand rotation 
task, according to whether the task depends on processes of motor or visual imagery. 
 45  If so, then this speculation would make sense of  Gallese  et al. ’ s (2004) otherwise puzzling 
claim that the activity of MNs underlies  an experiential  grasp of others ’ minds. 
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to the inferior parietal cortex, and is known to contain neurons with purely 
perceptual and no motor properties. This approach to the perceptual contribution 
of the STS to the representation of an agent ’ s goals and intentions is consistent with 
much evidence from single cell recordings in monkeys and brain imaging in humans, 
which shows that neurons in the STS respond to a vast array of eye- and head-
movements and movements of the whole body (including locomotion). In light of 
the critical importance of the perception of the head- and eye-movements of others 
for tracking their attention and detecting their prior intentions,  Allison  et al.  (2000) 
have suggested that there may be a purely perceptual network of  ‘ social perception ’ 
involving the STS, the amygdala and the orbito-frontal cortex. 46 So far, MNs have 
not been discovered for the execution and perception of head- and eye-movements. 
If I am right, this is to be expected: the job of MN activity is to compute motor 
commands from a representation of the agent ’ s prior intention, not to represent the 
agent ’ s prior intention on the basis of a representation of contextual cues, including 
the target of the agent ’ s visual attention. 
 Conclusions 
 In this paper, I have taken a critical look at  Gallese and Goldman ’ s (1998) inﬂ uential 
conjecture that MNs constitute a primitive version of a mental simulation heuristic 
that itself underlies mindreading. Given that MNs were ﬁ rst discovered in macaque 
monkeys and that the evidence for the existence of mindreading in monkeys is not 
overwhelming, this is a bold and interesting hypothesis. I have examined what 
seems to me the most coherent interpretation of this conjecture, namely  Goldman ’ s 
(2006) well-articulated view that not only pretence, but also MN activity, is best 
thought of as a process of mental simulation (in the similarity sense of  ‘ simulation ’ ). 
This view in turn is based on two presuppositions. The ﬁ rst is that MN activity is 
a motor resonance process that creates a neural similarity between an observer and 
an agent; the second is that this process of motor resonance enables the observer 
to represent the agent ’ s intention. 
 After emphasizing the hierarchical structure of a human agent ’ s intentions, I have 
argued that motor resonance could at best generate a representation of the agent ’ s 
motor intention (or motor command), not of her (social or non-social) prior 
intention. MN theorists have designed new experiments to support Gallese and 
Goldman ’ s conjecture. The results of these experiments have led them to endorse 
a new model, based on chains of logically related MNs. In considering the new 
model and the evidence that supports it, I made three complementary points. 
 First, I argued that the experimental results fail to demonstrate that MN 
activity generates a representation of the agent ’ s prior intention: they are 
consistent with an alternative interpretation on which MN activity presupposes 
 46  See also  Adolphs, 1999 and  Brothers, 1990 for an early anticipation of this view. 
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a representation of the agent ’ s intention, which in turn derives from the 
perception of contextual cues. Secondly, I have argued that the new model is 
inconsistent with a strict resonance model of the activity of MNs on which the 
perceptual properties of MNs are strictly congruent with their motor properties. 
Thirdly, I have further argued that there is a tension between the predictive 
role assigned to MNs by the new model and the retrodictive process whereby 
MNs would compute an agent ’ s intention on Gallese and Goldman ’ s explicit 
model. 
 Finally, drawing on an insight from  Csibra (2004, 2005) and on the computational 
resources afforded by the theory of internal models of actions, I have suggested an 
alternative interpretation of the function of MNs. On this account, MNs do not 
compute a representation of the agent ’ s intention from a representation of her 
motor command, in accordance with an internal forward model. Instead, they 
compute a representation of the agent ’ s motor command from a prior representation 
of the agent ’ s intention, in accordance with an internal inverse model. Thus, the 
present account does not detract from the signiﬁ cance of MNs for primates ’ social 
cognition, since it emphasizes their contribution to an observer ’ s ability to predict 
a conspeciﬁ c ’ s next motor act. 
 Institut Jean Nicod 
EHESS/ENS-DEC/CNRS 
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